We analyze survey data from 23 
disincentives to female caregivers' labor force participation (Glass &Estes 1997) .
This pattern, ofcourse, has serious implications for the well-being of women and their children (Casper, McLanahan & Garfinkel 1994; Hogan & Lichter 1995) . Because essentialist views about women's maternal nature and structural barriers to women's employment are both so widespread, we might expect to find similar attitudes toward married women's paid work from one industrialized country to the next.
Despite the strong case for similar attitudes, other factors argue for systematic, cross-national differencesin public opinion regarding married women's paid work. Attitudes toward women's roles have been shown to be responsive to the structural and cultural context (Alwin, Braun & Scott 1992; Rindfuss, Brewster & Kavee 1996) . Distinctive historical experiences produce distinctive national cultures (Inglehart 1990 ).For example, religiousheritage (Haller & Hoellinger 1994) and service sector development (Schultz 1990 ) are contextual factors that may influence views on married women's employment. In pursuing various objectives, states themselves promote policies (e.g., public child care and employment rules) that affect the reproduction of gender relations in the home and the workplace. Since national policies institutionalize family and gender ideologies (Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994) , state welfare regime type may form a basis for divergent views on married women's paid work. In fact, one indicator of the success of state interventions is whether state ideology is internalized by citizens and manifest in public opinion. Surprisingly lacking, however, is systematic empirical research showing whether national publics hold attitudes consistent with the ideologies that states promulgate.
In this article, we exploit newly availablecross-national survey data on attitudes toward married women's paid work over the life course. Data on nearly two dozen advanced industrial countries permit the first large-scale, systematic comparison of attitudes between countries that differ in historical experience and state ideology. To clarify the link between social structure and attitudes, we test whether socialist and capitalist welfare state distinctions or other factors can adequately explain country-to-country differences in public opinion toward married women working outside the home. Cluster and correspondence analyses show that the sample countries fall into three groups, each with somewhat different attitudes toward married women's employment. A novel application of the nested, one-way analysis of variance design gauges the importance of universally shared attitudes as compared with unique national cultures or with beliefs shared by the three groupings of states. To evaluate the degree of consensus within countries, this approach is generalized to consider widely documented gender differences in attitudes toward married women's employment.
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Attitudes toward Women and Work Asmarriedwomen's laborforce participation hasincreased in industrial countries, approval of nontraditional roles for women has also risen (Mason& Lu 1988; Spitze & Huber 1980) . For example, the proportion of people who believe that women's employment has negative effects on family and children has declined in Britain, Germany, and the U.s. (Scott, Alwin & Braun 1996) . It is not always clear whether attitudes lag or lead changes in behavior. Evidence for the U.S. suggests that increases in married women's labor force participation preceded more favorable public opinion toward women working (Oppenheimer 1978; Rindfuss, Brewster & Kavee 1996) . Cohort succession, rather than within-cohort attitude change, accounted for most of the 1972-88 liberalization in American attitudes aboutwomen's public and political roles (Firebaugh 1992) . Within-cohort change is credited with a larger role in the shift awayfrom traditional thinking about women's family responsibilities (Scott, Alwin & Braun 1996) .
At the individual level, women's paid employment fosters more egalitarian gender attitudes in women (Smith-Lovin & Tickamayer 1978) , their husbands (Smith 1985) , and their children (Powell & Steelman 1982) . Not surprisingly, womenwhoworkfull-time are more favorably disposed to women's employment than either women who work part-time or women who do not work for pay (Alwin, Braun& Scott1992; Glass 1992; Vogler 1994) . Although there is a positive relationbetween egalitarian genderbeliefs and hours ofpaid work, the association differs betweencountries, being larger in Sweden and Norwaythan in the U.S. (Baxter & Kane 1995) . Despite the association between genderrole attitudesand women's labor force participation over time and at the individuallevel, there is no clearassociation at the aggregate level for the eight, mostlyEuropeannations consideredby Hallerand Hoellinger (1994) . Countrieswith more liberalbeliefs about gender roles do not necessarily have higher rates of female employment. The Dutch combine egalitarian views with relatively low women's labor force participation, whereas Hungarians showtraditional gender attitudes and highrates of female employment (Haller & Hoellinger 1994) .
Belief in a strict,gender-based division of labor,a "separate spheres" ideology justifying married women's exclusion from the paid workforce, certainlyfinds less support today. Between the early1980s and the 1990s, the Americans, British, Dutch, Irish, Italians, Japanese, Swedes, and West Germansall becameless likely to agree that the husband should earn the money and the wife shouldtend to the home (Alwin, Braun& Scott1992; Hakim 1996) . In keeping withthese egalitarian trends, advanced industrial countries have come to accept married women working for pay, at least if a job is subordinated to family responsibilities such as the care of small children. Significant differences persistbetweenand within nations. For example, 620/0 of the Japanese, 290/0 of Germans, but only 130/0 of Swedes still approve of the «breadwinner husband-homemaker wife" model of family life (Hakim 1996) .
Although public opinion is favorably disposed to married women's employment, attitudes about female labor force participationare conditionedby beliefs about children and maternal responsibility. People who believe children are important to personal fulfillment hold less favorable attitudestoward women's work outsidethe home (Jones & Brayfield 1997) . Children are regardedas more central in some nations than in others. In a six-country study,Italianswerethe most likely to valuechildren, followed byAustrians, West Germans, the Irish,the British, and the Dutch (Jones & Brayfield 1997) . Reservations about women's paid work oftenreflect concerns about the well-being of children. Significant segments of national populations believe that a mother's labor force participation is deleterious to young children or to the mother-child relationship (Scott & Duncombe1992) . These concerns are more salient in somenationsthan in others. According to an eight-countrycomparison,the percentage of people who agree that preschool children suffer whenthe mother works is highest amongAustrians, followed by Germans,Hungarians, Italians, the Dutch, the Irish,the British, and Americans (Haller & Hoellinger 1994) . West Germansvoice more concernabout the effects of maternal employment on infants than do East Germans (Adler& Brayfield 1996) .
Given these concerns, it is not surprising to find resistance to mothers of preschoolchildrenworkingfor pay. Only about half of the respondents in Italy, the Netherlands, the U.S., and Ireland endorse these mothers working, whether part-time or full-time (Haller& Hoellinger 1994) . In GreatBritainand Germany (West), onlyabout a quarterof the respondents favor employment forwomenwith very young children. In Britain, Germany, and the U.S., men are lessapproving than womenof marriedwomenworking for pay, especially whentherearechildren in the home (Alwin, Braun & Scott 1992) . In recentyears, British men greweven more convinced than theywerepreviously that children suffer whentheir mother works outside the home (Scott, Alwin & Braun1996) . Thewell-documented gender gap in attitudes extendsto Hungary, where men are lesslikely than their female counterparts to supportwomen's paid employment (Panayotova & Brayfield 1997) . Men are more approvingthan women of a gender-based division of labor and of traditionalroles for women (Adler & Brayfield 1992; Baxter & Kane 1995; Scott& Duncombe 1992) .
In short, public opinion has becomemore favorable toward married women working for pay, but men continue to voice more traditional attitudes than do women. There is less support today for a strict, gendered division of labor relegating women to the home, but opposition to married women's work is still expressed in concerns about the effects of maternal employment on children. Substantial differences in attitudes toward gender roles existbetweencountries. Because mothers are held to different normativestandardsthan married women in general, comparative research needs to examine attitudes toward married women's employment over the entire life course, rather than at only one stage in family life. To understand cross-national similarities and differences in attitudes, it is important to know whether reservations about maternal employment extend to mothers of older children as well as to preschoolers and whether tolerance of married women's paid work applies equally to childless brides and empty-nest women.
Explanations for Cross-National Patterns
Cross-national survey comparisons of attitudes toward work, family, and gender have focused on a little more than a dozen European or English-heritage nations.' This comparative research reveals enough differences to suggest that distinctive national cultures may exist. It is not known, however, whether there are "families of nations" (Castles 1993) , groups of countries that hold similar attitudes toward married women's employment as a result of common language, shared culture, or common historical experience. While case-by-case comparisons have yielded useful insights, the absence ofkey contrasts (e.g., among formerly socialist states) is striking. Systematic analysis for a larger number of countries is necessary to detect the general patterns in attitudes that place earlier results in broader context.
Based on the limited number of cases examined, researchers have invoked state political ideologies to explain differences between countries in attitudes toward women's work (Adler & Brayfield 1996; Haller & Hoellinger 1994; Panayotova & Brayfield 1997; Scott, Alwin & Braun 1996) . Following the arguments of Kohn and Slomczynski (1990) about the influence of social structure on attitudes and values, Panayotova and Brayfield (1997) suggestthat political, institutional, and ideologicalfactors mediate the effect of social structure on public opinion regarding women's employment. Structural influences on rates offemale labor force participation, including levelofeconomic development (Pampel & Tanaka 1986; Semyonov 1980) and sector composition of the workforce (Oppenheimer 1978; Schultz 1990) , are well documented. Attitudes about women's employment are based, in part, on cognitive assessments of the structural circumstances making it more or less difficult or desirable for women to combine paid work and family responsibilities. In keeping with the reigning political philosophy, states shape those perceptions, particularly with interventions that mitigate child-care problems, gender pay inequality, and family financial need. In addition to influencing beliefs about what is, state propaganda about gender, work, and family may be internalized by individuals as normative judgments of what should be.
Implicit assumptions about gender and family are codified in the welfare,labor, and taxation policies of nations (Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994) .Western European states have been classified according to their support for the male-breadwinner model of the family (Ostner & Lewis 1995) .Britain, Germany,and the Netherlands are said to promote the traditional gendered division oflabor in familiesby virtue of welfare policies that treat women, not as workers, but as homemakers dependent on husbands for support. Sweden and Denmark, by contrast, encourage two-income families by supporting women's paid work and compensating mothers for time out of the labor force to raise children. Liberal welfare states like Australia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. are content to leave child care largely to market forces (Gustafsson 1994) . Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, and Sweden offer maternity benefits, job protections, and public child care that promote maternal attachment to employment (Gornick, Meyers & Ross 1998) . Given that mothers confronting less favorable leave policies are more likely to withdraw from the labor force (Glass & Riley 1998) , the policies that states institutionalize suggest the value accorded women's employment. As manifest in legal and institutional arrangements, state ideologiesare hypothesized to influence public opinion regarding the desirability of married women's paid work, especially when the women have young children. Ofcourse, public opinion may also dictate state policy, particularly in democratic regimes.
Although most cross-national studies of public opinion toward married women's employment focus on capitalist states, the difference between capitalist and socialist countries poses an important test of the political, ideological, and institutional determinants of attitudes toward women and work. The formerly socialist nations of Central and Eastern Europe maintained a distinctive ideology.
Theyencouragedwomen'sfull-timeemployment through full-employmentpolicies, universal child care, and an ethos stressing work as a civic duty and gender equality as a social goal (Adamik 1991; Broschart 1992; Drobnic 1997; Panayotova & Adler 1997) . Consistent with arguments regarding ideological, political, and institutional forces in the development of attitudes, East German women value work more highly than do their counterparts in Germany (West) (Adler & Brayfield 1997) . East Germans are less likely than West Germans to endorse the husband dedicating himself to his job while the wife stays home (Adler & Brayfield 1996) . Braun, Scott, and Alwin (1994) offer the tentative conclusion that East Germans' more positive attitudes toward women's paid work reflect economic necessity, namely, the greater perceived need for two incomes. Perhaps because of the tradition of well-developed child-care programs in the German Democratic Republic, East Germans are also less concerned about the consequences of women's employment for children and the family.
Comparing Hungary and the U.S., Panayotova and Adler (1997) document Hungarians' conservative gender attitudes and their high rates of women's labor force participation. Theyinterpret this gender conservatism as evidence of a public reaction against the sweeping socialist reforms that subjected women to burdensome labor in the workplace, the informal economy, and the household.
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While noting more conservative attitudes toward gender roles in Hungary than in Germany (East), Haller and Hoellinger (1994) speculate about a regional pattern where the need for two incomes fostered high female labor force participation in the face oftraditional attitudes toward gender and family. Given how few formerly socialist states have been compared, we lack definitive empirical evidence that a regional, socialist pattern actually exists. If there is a socialist pattern, it is not known whether the attitudes of Hungarians or East Germans are more representative of the command economy's legacy in Central and Eastern Europe.
Based on the state ideologiesguiding public policy, Blossfeld and Hakim (1997; Blossfeld & Drobnic 1999 ) identify five national patterns of female labor force participation. Consistent with earlier arguments, they acknowledge a distinctive pattern in Europe's formerly socialist states, which promoted women's full-time employment rather than part-time jobs. They also describe a distinctive regional pattern in southern European states, where married women are encouraged to stay home. Having lagged behind in the development of the welfare state, the modernization of family structure, and the transformation to a service economy, they argue, southern European countries continue to support a more traditional, gendered division of labor. (See also Esping-Andersen 1999.)
Blossfeldand Hakim (1997) American women tend to choose full-time employment, while British women, placing greater emphasis on the family, choose part-time jobs. Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology of capitalist welfare states asks whether the social rights of citizenship guarantee a livelihood regardless of labor market attachment. The typology has been criticized for neglecting gender (Sainsbury 1994) , but recent work offers a stronger rationale for linking state types to women's labor market behavior (Esping-Andersen 1999). One facilitator of women's paid work is defamilialization, whereby state programs relievethe family of sole responsibility for the support and care of dependents. Esping-Andersen (1999) finds defamilialization to be most advanced in the Scandinavian social democracies, where principles of equality translate into generous benefits for all. At the other extreme are Japan and southern Europe, which remain highly familistic, as evidenced by low levels of spending on family servicesand subsidies. Despite having broad social benefit programs that usurp market prerogatives, the Continent's conservative states are also very familistic on some indicators, reflecting their commitment to maintaining existing status differentials and traditional family arrangements. Falling somewhere in the middle on defamilialization are the largely Anglo-Saxon, liberalstates, whosemodest social insurance programs and means-testedbenefitsfor the poor give greater play to marketforces. Fromthisanalysis, weinferthat the social democracies will be most supportive of women's laborforce participation; that Japan, southern Europe, and conservative stateswillbe the least; and that liberalstateswillfall somewhere in the middle.
Alternative explanations for national differences in attitudes must also be considered Contrasting therelatively highgender inequality in the German-speaking nations of Germany (West) and Austria with the lowerlevels found in Nordic and English-speaking states (excluding Ireland), Schmidt (1993) hypothesizes that a common culturallegacy oflanguage may be at work. He alsoconsiders religious traditions, pointingout that female laborforce participation increased more slowly in Catholic countries than in Protestantones. Lesthaeghe (1995) reaches a similar conclusion. Positive correlations are reported between Protestant religion and "female work desirability" (Siaroff1994) and between percent Protestant and egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment (Haller& Hoellinger 1994) . Protestant countries with stronglabor unionsand leftist political parties havebeen particularly successful in implementing egalitarian genderpolicies (Norris 1987) . While shaping the historical development ofcapitalist welfare stateregimes (EspingAndersen 1990), religion may have an independent effect as well: Protestant countries advocated less traditional roles for women and embraced secularism earlierthan did Catholic countries.
The researchliterature based on paired comparisonsbetween countries has revealed significant differences in attitudes toward gender, work, and family. Because stateideologies embodyassumptions about appropriate genderroles, they are one possible source of cross-nationalvariation in public opinion. Common language and shared religious legacy are other possible sources of variation in attitudes betweencountries. Because ideology, language, and religion transcend the boundaries ofthe nation-state, theyarethe basis for expecting national attitudes to be summarizedby a few broad patterns. Identifying attitudinal regimes calls for the systematic analysis of cross-national surveydata for a large number of countries that representthe keydimensionsthat are hypothesized to distinguish patterns of female labor force participation over the life course.
Data and Methods
Our analysis capitalizes on newdatafrom the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), made available by the Zentralarchivfur Empirische Sozialforschung in Cologne/ An established program of cross-nationalcollaboration, the ISSP has facilitated social science surveys since 1985 (Smith 1992) . In 1994, independent research institutions replicated survey questions on family and gender roles, typically as a supplement to national probability surveys. Data are available for 24, largely Western and industrial countries. Excluding the less developed Philippines, we focus on 23 nations. These include the formerly socialist states of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany (East), Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia; the southern European states of Italy and Spain; the Scandinavian social democracies of Norway and Sweden; the conservative welfare states of Austria, Israel, the Netherlands, and Germany (West); and the liberal welfare states of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, and the U.S. (Esping-Andersen 1999; Stier, Lewin-Epstein & Braun 1998). Sample sizes range from 647 in Northern Ireland to 2,494 in Spain. While not exhaustive (nor representative of any universe except countries agreeing to participate in the ISSP surveys), the sample improves on previous research on attitudes toward gender roles. The ISSP data offer a larger number of countries as well as opportunities for key comparisons between capitalist nations and formerly socialist states, northern and southern European countries, countries with a Catholic heritage and those with a Protestant one, and several sets of countries sharing a common language.
Survey informants were asked to give their opinion on whether and how much women should work at various points in the life course. The question read: "Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part time or not at all under these circumstances?" Although single women's employment was not addressed, the survey asked for opinions about married women's work during four stages in the life course: after marriage and before they have children, when they have a preschool child, after the youngest child starts school, and after the children leave home.
The analysis begins by aggregating the percentage distributions for the 33,590 respondents into a matrix of 23 rows (the countries) by 12 columns (the three response categories for each of the four family life-stage items). The matrix, which appears below as Table 1 , displays many interesting differences and similarities across countries and life-course stages, but some data reduction strategy is necessary in order to identify broad patterns in attitudes.
Our analytic strategy uses cluster analysisto group countries into homogeneous "attitude regimes" that share common views about married women's work over the life course. After the clusters and their constituent countries are identified, correspondence analysis provides a visual representation of the relationships between the countries and clusters.Correspondence analysisalso suggeststhe factors or dimensions underlying national differencesin attitudes toward married women's work at various stages of the family life course. Our substantive interpretations of these dimensions receive some validation from their correlation with independent indicators of key concepts. To assess the relative significance of cluster effects and country effects on attitudes, we generalize a one-way, nested ANOVAdesign. This yields a novel decomposition of the sum of squares in Table 1 into the components attributable to shared attitudes, attitudes common to multicountry clusters, and 1418/ Social Forces 78:4, June 2000 attitudes specific to individual countries. Since gender differences in attitudes toward women's roles are well documented, we extend this decomposition to evaluate the effect of gendergapsin publicopinion on the clustermembership of individual countries.
Hierarchical cluster analysis determines the number of clusters, or broad attituderegimes, amongthe 23countries. Instead of grouping countries into some predetermined number of clusters, the hierarchical procedure aggregates countries on a step-by-step basis (Everitt 1993). By minimizing within-cluster variance, Ward's cluster method determines howmanyclusters to select and what countries belong to each cluster. Sequential aggregations of clusters into larger clusters are undertaken until additional aggregations result in a significant increase in variance within clusters. To assign countries to clusters optimally, a k-mean algorithm is used. This algorithm ascertains the optimal clusteringsolution for the N-group partition impliedby the Ward's clustering procedure.
Having identified clusters, weapplycorrespondence analysis to map countries and clusters in two-dimensional space. Although not routinely employed withbig, cross-national surveys, this multidimensional scaling technique has seen wide applicationin the socialsciences, particularlyin cultural anthropology, whereit is used to study cultural consensus (Weller & Romney 1990) . Decomposing a matrixinto its underlying structure basedon singular value decomposition (SVD), correspondence analysis examines the relations among rowsor columnswithout distinguishing dependent and independent variables. Themethodprovides a visual representation derived from a chi-square decomposition of the contingency table in Table 1 . Countries that areclose to one anotherin two-dimensional space present similar patternsof responses; thosethat are distanthavedissimilar patterns. Each axisembodies factors that underpin attitudinal differences betweencountries.
Cluster analysis and correspondence analysis do not provide an estimate of the relative importance ofbroad attitude regimes or idiosyncratic national cultures. Toward this end,weemploy a form of hierarchical modeling (Byrk & Raudenbush 1992), namely, a one-way, nested ANOVA design (Kirk 1968; SAS 1989) . In this analysis, the total sum of squares in Table 1 can be decomposed into three components. An indicatorof the extentto whichcountriesshareattitudes, which we callthe consensus model (CM) sum of squares (SSCM)' refers to the portion that can be attributed to the average profile across countries. The difference between the total sum of squares and the CM sum of squares represents the part that cannot be explained by the consensus model, that is, the «consensus model error" (CME). To measurethe effect of partitioning units (as the cluster analysis does), we apply a nested model that further decomposes the consensus model error into two components-the sum of squaresbetweenclusters (SSB) and the sum of squares within clusters (SSw). The three component sums of
The larger the SSB' the more distinct the cluster from the average attitude profile. The smaller the SSw' the more homogeneous the cluster and the less important national cultures or country-specific "error:'
Findings
The data in Table 1 present clear results. Virtually everyone agrees that married women should work before they have children. On average, 800/0 of all respondents favor full-time employment, 150/0 part-time, and only 50/0 recommend staying home. National differences are apparent, nonetheless. No Swedes think married women should stay home before having children, whereas 21% of Poles believe they should. Support for full-time paid work early in marriage is as high as 940/0 in Canada and Sweden and as low as 620/0 in Russia. Once women have children, public opinion favors their reducing their labor force involvement. When the youngest child is a preschooler, only 90/0 of all respondents, on average, favor full-time work and 390/0 part-time. The "stay at home" option is selected by 520/0. Again, there is cross-national variation. In Poland, 760/0 recommend that the mother of a preschooler stay at home, while only 190/0 in Israel do. Israelis (630/0) and East Germans (640/0) are the most likely to suggest that mothers of young children work part-time. Although full-time work does not find a great deal of support, the percentages endorsing this option for mothers of preschoolers range from 1% in Germany (West) to 180/0 in Canada and Israel.
Maternal employment is more popular when the youngest child goes to school. On average, 240/0 of all respondents favor full-time employment, 580/0 part-time, and 180/0 staying home. Cross-national differences are striking. While 480/0 of Canadians believe the mother of a schoolchild should work full-time, only 50/0 of West Germans recommend full-time employment. While only 30/0 of Swedes recommend staying home, 41% of Poles favor this option. After the children have left home, however, even full-time work finds favor. On average, 730/0 of the national publics recommend full-time paid work, 21% part-time, and only 60/0 staying at home. In a few countries, some people seem to find full-time work incompatible with domestic responsibilities even when women no longer have child-care responsibilities. In Spain and Italy, 16% and 180/0 of the respondents, respectively, favor women staying home. In contrast, less than 20/0 of the respondents from Germany (East), Great Britain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden regard staying home as a good choice after children are grown. To determine whether cross-national variation in attitudes canbe summarized in terms of a fewbroad patterns,weturn to the results of the clusteranalysis. The 23ISSP countries canbe adequately described asbelonging to onlythreeclusters. In the Ward's procedure, the majorityof the increase in variance within clusters occurs after the first three aggregations. Earlier aggregations do not result in a significant increase in variance. Figure 1 shows the three clusters' percent distribution profiles, that is, the percentage of respondents in eachcluster choosing full-time, part-time,or stayat-home responses for each of the four family life-course stages. In the "after marriage, before child" stage, full-time employment is overwhelmingly the norm in all three clusters. Support for full-time work is almostas high after children MarriedWomen'sEmployment /1421 clusters show part-time work as the most popular option for mothers with schoolage children. Despite country-to-country differences, there is a high level of agreement that women without children should work for pay, usually full-time, but that mothers with children who require care should reduce their labor force involvement by staying home or working only part-time. The three clusters are best described as variations on this general theme. The first cluster contains Canada, Germany (East), Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S. This is a "work-oriented" cluster. Whatever the life-course stage, the cluster's respondents are the least likely to recommend 1422/ Social Forces 78:4, June 2000 Respondents are apt to recommend working, albeit part-time, when children are young. On average, only 36% of the cluster's respondents suggest that women stay at home when there is a preschooler, compared with 52% across all countries. When there is a schoolage child, the figure endorsing stayinghome is 7% for the work-oriented countries, versus 18% across all 23 countries. The second, and biggest, cluster, which we call "family accommodating;' is made up of Australia, Austria, Germany (West), Great Britain, Italy,Japan, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, and Russia. Compared with the work-oriented cluster, the family-accommodating clusterputs less stress on married women's labor force participation. Respondents in this cluster are less likely to endorse full-time employment, even after children are grown. When the youngest child is a preschooler) their most common recommendation isthat the mother stayat home, as compared with the modal work part-time response for the work-oriented cluster. When the youngest child goes to school, they favor part-time work.
The third clusteris made up of Bulgaria) the Czech Republic) Hungary) Ireland) Poland)Slovenia) and Spain.We describethis cluster as"motherhood-centered," Respondents favor full-time work before and after children) and, like the respondents in the family-accommodating cluster) theyadvocate that motherswith preschool childrenstayhome. For motherswith school-age children, theyendorse part-time work) albeit to a lesser extent than in other clusters, where there is greater. agreement that part-time work is the best way to reconcileemployment and family demands. In the motherhood-centered cluster) workingpart-timewhen children are in school is only slightlymore popular than working full-time or staying home. While motherhood-centeredcountriesdo not uniformlyrejectthe idea of mothers working) they have a larger contingent that does, suggesting low consensus on how mothers with school-age childrenshould balancemotherhood and employment, Althoughthree distinctattitude clusters are identified) the clusters havea great deal in common. When we compute the sum of squares acrossthe 23 countries in Table 1 , we find that fully 880/0 of the total sum of squares is attributable to the consensusmodel of attitudes shared by all the countries.' As Figure2 shows) only60/0 of the total sum of squares is attributable to the three clusters and another 60/0 to country-specific "error," This impliesremarkably high country-to-country similarityin attitudes," Clustersare not extremetypes) but rather variationson a theme -acceptance of married women's employmentcoupledwith the ideathat young children callfor reductions in labor supply. The unique national cultures' component of attitudes (i.e., country-specific "error") is as significant as the broader attitudinal regimescaptured by the clusters.
Correspondence analysis mapscountries and clusters in two-dimensional space. The first) horizontal dimension in Figure3 reflects the broad societal factorsthat promote overallfemale labor forceparticipation. Schmidt (1993) constructed an unweighted, additive indexof social and political factors associated withthe growth in women's labor force participation rates in capitalist states. This broad index incorporates indicators of fertility trends) sector employment shifts) expansion of child-care facilities, tax incentives for female employment, trade union activity) early female suffrage) parliamentary representation of women) the dominant postwar political party)and Protestant heritage. For 13 countries for which it is available) Schmidt's index of women's labor force participation promoters correlates .798 with loadings on the first dimension from the correspondence analysis. Thus) there is persuasive evidence that countries) attitudes toward . In fact, countryloadings on thisdimension correlate .864 withthe percentage of the populationrecommending full-time employment for mothersof school-age children. Thefamily-accommodating countries injhe lower halfofFigure 3largely rejectfull-time workfor mothers. For example, only1% of West Germans think a womanwitha preschool childshouldworkfull-time, and only5%recommend full-time workwhenthe child isschool-age. In contrast, the motherhood-centered and the work-oriented countries dominatethe upper halfofFigure 2, indicating that the two clusters are comparatively tolerant of mothers' full-time work.
Thisis not to saythat mothers'full-time employment is a popularchoice. In Canadaand Israel, the countries voicing the strongest supportfor full-time work by mothers of preschool children, only 18% of the respondents choose this response. In Canadaand other work-oriented countries, the general preference is for mothers of preschoolers to stayhome or to work only part-time and for mothers of schoolchildren to work, ifnot full-time, then part-time.Bycontrast, Married Woments Employment/1425 FIGURE 3: Clusters in Correspondence Analysis Space . ""
Women's laborforceparticipation in motherhood-centered countries) part-time employment isnot overwhelmingly preferredand comparatively strongsupportfor mothers'full-time employment is combined witheven stronger preferences that women withchildren stayhome. Given their liberal genderrole attitudes, it is not surprising that the workorientedcountries are tolerantof full-time employment for mothers. AsTable 2 shows, respondents in the work-oriented cluster holdless traditional views about the gendered division oflaborand perceive fewer conflicts between women's work and family roles. On a four-point scale, they are significantly less likely than respondents in other clusters to agree with statements like "A job isall right) but what most womenreally want is a home and children" or ''A preschool child is likely to suffer if hisor hermotherworks:' A progressive gender ideology, however, cannot accountfor the tolerantviews of mothers'full-time employment among 1426/ Social Forces 78:4, June 2000 respondents in the motherhood-centered cluster, because they voice the most conservative attitudes on all five statements about gender roles. Respondents in the family-accommodating cluster, who reject mothers' full-time employment, generally fall somewhere between the respondents in the other two clusters in their gender beliefs.
THE EFFECT OF GENDER DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES
By displaying how each country is positioned vis-a-vis the clusters, Figure 2 reinforces the observation that countries -even those in different clustershave a lot in common. For example, Ireland and the Czech Republic fall within the motherhood-centered cluster, but the opinions of the Irish and the Czechs place these countries close to the U.S., a country belonging to the work-oriented cluster. To understand why some countries have ambiguous cluster membership, we consider within-country attitude differences, focusing on the gender gap that has been documented for attitudes toward women's roles.
We first aggregate responses into a new matrix (not shown) of 46 rows (23 countries times 2 genders) by the 12 attitude response columns. Thus, each country has two profiles, one for men and one for women. When we apply cluster analysis to this matrix, both men's and women's attitude profiles fall in the same cluster for 18 of the 23 countries. This is not surprising, because the association between respondent's gender and attitudes toward married women's paid work is relatively weak. In no country does Cramer's V exceed .20. In most countries, men and women have very similar attitudes.
In five countries (the Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Russia, and Slovenia), attitude differences between men and women are large enough that the genders fall into different clusters. Except for Slovenia, these countries fall at the borders of the clusters in Figure 2 . Small shifts in public opinion could push anyone of these countries into a different cluster. For countries where the genders differ in cluster membership, men's profiles are classified as motherhood-centered. Women's profiles are classifiedas work-oriented, except for Russia,where women are included in the family-accommodating cluster.WereRussianwomen's attitudes like Russian men's, Russia would be placed in the motherhood-centered cluster, where most of the other formerly socialist states are located. Similarly,were the attitudes of Italian women more like those of Italian men, Italy would be in the motherhood-centered cluster with the other southern European country, Spain.
To measure how much gender affects attitude sharing across nations, we decompose the sum of squares in the new 46-row matrix. Assuming the general model holds for both men and women, we assign a country's overall cluster membership (as described earlier) to both genders in that country (Widmer, Treas & Newcomb 1998) . Results are virtually identical to those produced by the general model: 860/0 of the total sum of squares is shared, 60/0 is cluster- specific, and 8% is country-specific "error:' If we permit clustermembership to varyacross genders, weget identical results. Thus,maleand female profiles show somedifferences in five of the 23 countries. Those differences, while substantively interesting, are not large enoughto undermineour general conclusion. Industrial countriessharemost attitudesabout married women's labor force participation.
Discussion
This study demonstrates that industrialized countrieshold verysimilarattitudes about marriedwomen's laborforce participation. Given cross-national similarities in the organizationof work and domesticresponsibility, high consensus is to be expected. All countries endorse married women's full-time employmentbefore children.Allcountries favorfull-time, or at leastpart-time, work once children havelefthome.Allcountriesrecognize that motherhood demandsa reductionin labor supply. Countries display three variationson this general theme.
People in work-oriented countries arethe least likely to endorse womenstaying home.Theyarethe mostfavorable to paidworkbut usually recommend part-time, not full-time, employment for mothers of young children. Those in familyaccommodating countriesbelieve that mothersof smallchildrenbelongat home and that mothersof school-age children shouldworkonlypart-time. Respondents in motherhood-centered countries are the most likely to endorse staying home, but theydisplay littleconsensus regarding mothers of school-age children, ifonly because they are the leastlikely to advocate their part-time employment. 78:4, June 2000 In terms of female labor force participation patterns, industrializedcountries have been described as belonging to five groups, namely, the formerly socialist statesof Central and EasternEurope, the southern European countries,the social democratic welfare states, the conservative welfare states, and the liberal welfare states (Blossfeld & Hakim 1997) . According to our analysis, however, the 23 ISSP countriesfall into onlythree clusters with respect to attitudestoward married women's employment.
1428/ Social Forces
There are good reasonsto expecta distinctive socialist influenceon attitudes. The command economiesof Easternand Central Europe promoted high rates of female labor forceparticipationnot onlywith ideologies stressing genderequality and the obligation to work but also with institutions of full employment and universalchild care. The motherhood -centered cluster captures five of the seven ISSP countries with a socialist legacy. Although Russia does not belong to this cluster, it is only because Russian women do not share Russian men's views about married women'slabor force participation. While most formerly socialist states may be motherhood-centered, a socialist legacy is not the defining characteristic of the motherhood-centered cluster, if onlybecausethe clusteralso includesSpain and Ireland. Southern Europe has been described as distinctive in its traditionalismand its persistent familism. Spain is grouped with the once-socialist states in the motherhood-centered cluster. Italy is grouped with other conservative familyaccommodatingnations, althoughits clustermembershipis due largely to gender differences in attitudes toward mothers' employment: Italy would also be motherhood-centered if Italian women's attitudes were as traditional as Italian men's. While Spain and Italy do not constitute a cluster of their own, the two countriesdo sharetraditionalperspectives on married women's employment (e.g., some enthusiasm for women stayinghome even after their children are grown). The correspondence analysis shows that Italy and Spain fall close together on the firstdimension, female laborforce participation promoters. Thislendscredence to the contention that there are regional similarities among southern European countries (Blossfeld & Hakim 1997) .
Although the formerly socialistcountries and the southern European states were hypothesized to differ in their approaches to women's employment, both setsof countriesare represented in the motherhood-centered cluster. Since Ireland also falls in this cluster, the common denominator is neither state ideologynor region. Given the countries' location on the first (horizontal) dimension of the correspondence analysis, such highly correlated factors as late economic development,traditional gender beliefs, and non-Protestant heritage offermore compelling explanations of the similarities in attitudeamongmotherhood-centered countries.
The structure of employmentalso unitesthe southern Europeancountriesand the formerly socialist states.Compared with respondents in other clusters, those in the motherhood-centered cluster are less likely to recommend part-time employment for mothers. Substantial numbers favor full-time work, and even more choose the stay-at-home response. This pattern is consistent with the fact that part-time work is not readily available in the once-socialiststates or in southern Europe. Women have the choice of working full-time or not at all-an objective condition of employment that surely influences respondents' evaluation of alternatives.
Rather than create part-time jobs to help women balance the demands ofwork and family, the once-socialist states provided maternal leave followed by child care to allow mothers to return to full-time employment (Drobnic 1997) . That benefits such as housing were tied to full-time employment increased the incentive to be a full-time worker. Part-time jobs created by postsocialist economic dislocations are involuntary and unwelcome, since families depend on two full incomes. In southern Europe, the slower expansion of the public sector constrained demand for female workers. Even in 1994, only 20/0 of working women in Slovenia and 150/0 in Spain were part-timers; the figures were 250/0 in the U.S., 440/0 in the U.K., and 660/0 in the Netherlands (Blossfeld & Hakim 1997) . Without recourse to part-time jobs to reconcile work and family conflicts, respondents in the motherhood-centered cluster display low consensus on what mothers of school-age children should do. Some favor part-time work. Another segment ofthe population recommends full-time maternal employment (i.e., the Marxist model in socialist countries). An even bigger constituency supports mothers staying home, which is consistent with the cluster's traditional views on the gender-based division of labor.
Systematic differences in the public policies of capitalist welfare states led to the expectation that public opinion about married women's employment would differ by welfare regime type. Although they may be identified with different public policies, the three capitalist welfare state types -social democratic, liberal, and conservative -do not constitute distinct regimes of public opinion. Siaroff (1994) reaches similar conclusions regarding the limitations of Esping-Andersen's (1990) capitalist welfare state typology for understanding the desirability of women's employment. Of course, our results apply only to the ISSP nations, and a different sample of countries might yield somewhat different results.
The socialdemocratic welfarestates of Scandinavia,represented here by Sweden and Norway, present the anticipated work-oriented pattern, but they are not unique. Two liberal welfare states, the U.S.and Canada, are also part of the work-oriented cluster. In two-dimensional space, the Netherlands, a conservative welfare state, lies very close to the Scandinavian countries. So does Germany (East), which might be expectedto adopt the motherhood-centered orientation of other formerlysocialist states. (Of course, the transition from socialism in Germany (East) has been complicated by German reunification, which has posed unique economic pressures, including high consumer aspirations and large layoffs of women workers.) In short, the strong support for female labor force participationin the work-oriented cluster isfoundin countries withverydifferent political heritagessocial democratic, liberal, conservative, and socialist.
The family-accommodating group is also diverse, containing conservative, liberal, and formerly socialist states. Asanticipated, it includes conservative welfare regimes, like Austria, Italy, and Germany (West), that support a traditional, genderbased division of labor (Bimbi 1993; Ostner 1993) . It also includes the liberal states ofAustralia, Great Britain, NewZealand, NorthernIreland, and Japan. While they may all deemphasize public responsibility in favor of market and family provisions, liberalstatesare quite heterogeneous in their approaches to welfare and employment. That the U.S. and Canadafall into a work-oriented cluster while Great Britain andAustralia belong to thefamily-accommodating group is consistent with fine-grained social policy analyses of these four liberal states (O'Connor, Orloff & Shaver 1999). Unexpectedly, Russia also falls in the familyaccommodating cluster, due largely to the attitudes of Russian women.
Because a sharedlanguage pointsto sharedcultureand facilitates institutional convergence betweencountries,language might be expected to influence cluster membership more than it apparently does. Ifthere is a German-language "family of nations" (Schmidt 1993) with respectto attitudes towardwomen's labor force participation, it does not include the former Germany (East). Nor do we find evidence of an English-speaking family of nations. Australia, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, and Great Britain belongto the family-accommodating cluster, but Canada and the U.S. aregrouped withthe work-oriented, while Ireland belongs to the motherhood-centered. Another cultural explanation, religious tradition, fares better. For 20 countries for which we have data, the percent Protestant in 1900 (Barrett 1992) correlates .717 with loadings on the first dimension of the correspondence analysis. This finding is consistent with the argument that countries with a Protestant heritage emphasized less rigid gender roles, moved more quickly toward secularism, and more readilyimplementeda leftistagenda of policies that were favorable toward women.
Conclusion
On a case-by-case basis, a substantialresearch literature has documented crossnational differences in attitudes toward gender, work, and family. This article presentsa methodological approach-the systematic analysis of surveydata on a larger number of countries-that establishes a context for evaluating and extendingthis research tradition. Althoughthe analysis confirmsthat there are differences between nations in attitudes toward married women's labor force participation, decomposing the totalsum of squares shows that attitudesimilarities far overshadow the differences. Despitethe various programmatic initiatives of individual countries, it would appear that more universal factors, namely, the structuralobstacles to combining motherhoodand employment, arethe dominant influences on normative views. The23 countries do cluster intothreebroadattitude patterns, although the residual differences between countries (i.e., national cultures) are as important as differences between the clusters. The clusters representsubtle variations on sharedviews: There is widespread agreement that married women shouldworkfor paybut that mothersofyoungchildren shouldreduce their labor force involvement.
Nations showno one-to-one correspondence between public opinionregarding women's employment and the political ideologies that shapepublic policies. Rather than mapping closely to politicalorientations, attitudes reflect location along a generaldimension of cultural and structural factors promoting women's overall labor forceparticipation and alonga specific maternal employmentdimension, 'reflecting the availability of part-time work. As the clusters demonstrate, Scandinavian social democracies hold common views, but these are sharedwith other types of welfare regimes. A capitalist welfare regimelike the conservative or liberalstatemay be compatible with several patterns of public opinion. While most of the formerly socialist statesthat weexamined display attitudesthat place them in the samecluster, the importance ofsocialist stateideology ishardlycertain; some nonsocialist states -characterized by Catholic heritage, gender traditionalism, and late industrial development -share these views. No factor takenindividually is sufficient to understand cluster membership. Instead, wemust consider a constellation of highlycorrelatedvariables that affect public opinion on married women's employment, While more research is required to sort out these relationships, the map of countries generated by correspondence analysis is a useful guide for future investigation. Our systematic analysis of a relatively large number of countries provides a context for interpreting the results of prior studies. Our analysis suggests, for example, that Hungary (or perhaps Bulgaria) is a better exemplar than is Germany (East) of attitudes toward married women's employment in formerly socialist states. In fact, the former Germany (East) would seem to constitute a deviant caseinvitingcloser study. Germany(West), regardedas the archetype of a conservative state promoting breadwinner-husband-andhomemaker-wife families, isshown to be a particularly extreme case in itsaversion to maternal employment, The Netherlands, oftencomparedwith Germanyin its view of female employment, proves to be surprisingly supportive of mothers working, even full-time. Despitehigh rates of full-time female employment in the U.S. that contribute to a careerist reputation, American attitudes toward married women'semploymentare not particularlyextreme. Asa tool to selectcountries that best fit theoretical concepts and to identifyanomalies that call for further study, this empirical approach is a useful complement to the methods of comparative research.
